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CORPORATE LAW-Formulating and Applying a "Proper
Purpose" Analysis to a Books and Records Inspection
Request-Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Electric

Cooperative, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Electric Cooperative, Inc.' the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that a rural electric cooperative member could inspect
cooperative books and records when she desired to inform herself and others of the
records' contents through publication of her findings.2 The court allowed inspection
because the member stated a "proper purpose."3 The Schein opinion sets guidelines
for what constitutes a "proper purpose" when members request information from
cooperatives and when shareholders request information from companies. The
court's decision is significant because it establishes, for the first time in New Mexico,
that a "proper purpose" for access to corporate information should reasonably relate
to the shareholder's interest and should not harm the cooperative/corporation or its
members/shareholders.4 This Note examines the court's formulation of the "proper
purpose" boundaries and discusses the significance of the decision for New Mexico
business enterprises, their members and shareholders, and also for business
development in our state.
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5
Maureen Schein (Schein) lives in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, within the area
served by the Northern Rio Arriba Electric Cooperative (NORA), a "cooperative
nonprofit membership corporation" organized under the Rural Electric Cooperative
Act.7 She receives her electricity from NORA and is a member in good standing.
Schein works for the Rio Grande Sun newspaper in Espafiola, New Mexico.
In 1992, Schein requested seven years of financial information from NORA,
which NORA refused. After Schein filed a mandamus action, NORA voluntarily
surrendered the documents and Schein dismissed her suit. In 1994, Schein requested
NORA's budget materials for that year. NORA granted her request with the
exception of one excluded page. A subsequent demand letter from Schein's counsel
led to the full disclosure of the missing document. That same year, Schein also asked
for access to salary figures of all NORA employees. When NORA refused, Schein
brought her second mandamus action in which she sought not only current salary
levels but also access to present and future budget records. Although the district court
1. 122 N.M. 800, 932 P.2d 490 (1997).
2. See id. at 803-04, 932 P.2d at 493-94.
3. See id. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
4. See id.
5. Unless otherwise noted, all factual references in this section refer to Schein, 122 N.M. at 801-03, 932 P.2d
at 491-93.
6. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-15-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-15-1 to -33 (Repl. Pamp. 1993). Subsection 62-15-3(Q) brings cooperatives
organized under the Act within the scope of the Business Corporation Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-11-1 to -18-12
(Repl. Pamp. 1993 & Supp. 1996), for "activities and transactions for the mutual benefit of its members and patrons"
not discussed in the Rural Electric Cooperative Act or the cooperative's articles of incorporation or bylaws. See id.
§ 62-15-3(Q) (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
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dismissed this action, because disclosure might violate privacy interests of NORA
employees, it indicated that Schein should have access to other financial records,
books and reports.
In 1995, Schein filed a third mandamus action, which is the subject of this case.
Earlier that year, she requested copies of legal bills that two law firms had submitted
to NORA for defending the cooperative in the previous two mandamus actions.
When Schein's request for billing information led NORA to produce only edited
copies of the requested bills, Schein filed suit.
Following an in camera review of the itemization sought, the district court granted
Schein's writ. Not only did it provide for disclosure of the redacted billing
information, the district court gave Schein prospective access to NORA's books and
records upon reasonable request. Additionally, the writ of mandamus retained
jurisdiction for the district court in the event that NORA refused to disclose a
requested item. On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the writ
exceeded its permissible scope. However, the supreme court affirmed the district
court's decision to permit inspection. Publication of the rural electric cooperative's
legal bill was therefore a proper purpose.

m11.

BACKGROUND

Other Jurisdictions
Corporate shareholders' long-recognized right of inspection has evolved in their
favor, entrenched not only in common law but in state statutes as well.' The law
confers similar inspection rights not only on corporate shareholders, but also on other
business forms, including cooperatives.' However, the inspection right is limited.
Before exercising the right, a shareholder must have a "proper purpose," a nebulous
term that has spawned much litigation.'0 This section will summarize the evolution
of American shareholder inspection rights, discussing the types of organizations
affected and focusing on the proper purpose requirements. It will also examine the
embryonic stage of New Mexico case law within the existing state statutory
framework.

A.

1. Right of Inspection
Historically, a shareholder had a right to inspect corporate records in English
common law." This right of inspection survived in America, with qualifications. 2
Generally stated, the common law allowed a shareholder, acting in good faith, to
inspect corporate records at reasonable times and for proper purposes. 3 However,

8. See Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding
Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 336-40 (1996).
9. See 5A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2227, at 424 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995).
10. See id. § 2222, at 386.
11. See, e.g., In re Steinway, 53 N.E. 1103, 1105 (N.Y. 1899).
12. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 2214, at 342.
13. See id.
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inspection was not granted to satisfy a shareholder's idle curiosity" or in broad
recognition of an unqualified right.15
In the nineteenth century, with the growth in complexity and numbers of
corporations, shareholders desired a more reliable mechanism to promote the flow
of information between the two groups. 6 The ensuing codification of the common
law right of inspection, with its proper purpose requirement, initially placed a
significant burden upon the shareholder and bred litigation. 7 Thus, many state
legislatures abandoned the proper purpose requirement as too restrictive, which, in
turn, led to shareholder abuse of access rights.18 Finally, the pendulum swung back
towards where it points today, with the proper purpose limitation restored. 9
Now, every United States jurisdiction has codified the shareholder right of
inspection,"° which most state courts interpret as expanding the pre-existing common
law right.21 Generally stated, inspection rights extend "(1) to qualified shareholders
(2) upon written demand (3) at reasonable times and (4) for a proper purpose. '
The right of shareholder inspection stems from the shareholder's property interest
in the business.? Inspection embodies the shareholder's need for self-protection.4
Thus, because shareholders are owners interested in the corporation and its officers,
who act on behalf of the corporation's investors, the law provides a means for
promoting accountability. 5
2. Types of Organizations
All corporations, whether closely or publicly held, are subject to inspection by
their shareholders. 26 Statutes also extend inspection rights to not-for-profit

14. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 156 (1905).
15. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 2214, at 342.
16. See Thomas, supra note 8,at 338.
17.

See JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BuSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES, 1780-1970, 89 (1970).
18. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 339. For example, rival corporations would obtain each other's stock to gain
access to corporate information, thus acquiring an unearned advantage. See id.
19. See id. at 340.
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 624 (McKinney 1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-11-50 (Repl. Pamp. 1993); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 16.01-.04 (1984).
21. See FLECHER, supra note 9,§ 2215.10, at 353. Statutory right, however, co-exists with common law right
absent express legislative intent to restrict common law access to corporate records. See id. § 2214, at 342.
22. Id. § 2215, at 348. See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (1984).
23. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1905) (adding that "those in charge of the
corporation are merely the agents of the stockholders, who are the real owners of the property"); see also Durnin v.
Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Kalanges v. Champlain Valley
Exposition, Inc., 632 A.2d 357, 359 (Vt. 1993).
24. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 2213, at 336.
25. See William Coale Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 170 N.E. 434, 435 (Ohio 1930). The court stated:
Can anything be plainer than the fact that the owner of property has a clear right to inspect his own
property? When the owner of property selects an agent or agents to care for and manage his
property, how can that act be held to clothe the agent with power to manage the owner as well as
to manage the property, and to prevent the owner from even looking at his own property except
he do so pursuant to the rules and restrictions promulgated by the agent, who is wholly without
power or authority to formulate any such rules or regulations? Are we to forget and abandon all
the law pertaining to the relation of principal and agent?
Id.
26. See FLETCHER, supranote 9, § 2227, at 424.
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corporations,27 condominium associations,' s cooperatives generally, 9 and to rural
electric cooperatives specifically. 0 In the only decision involving rural electric
cooperative members' inspection rights, the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted a
statutory scheme in which such cooperatives were formed under that state's
Nonprofit Corporation Act.3 ' Both of Idaho's Nonprofit Corporation Act and Idaho's
Business Corporation Act provide for member/shareholder inspection rights.3 2
Although the Nonprofit Act controls,3 the court has held that inspection rights would
exist under either statute. 4
3. Proper Purpose
Much of the litigation on shareholder inspection revolves around the propriety of
"purpose." In general, a shareholder states a proper purpose when his request: 1)
relates to his position as a shareholder; 2) is lawful; and 3) is not contrary or
harmful to the interest of the corporation. 6 Courts construe the "proper purpose" test
liberally in favor of shareholders.3 7 Indeed, the burden of proof is on the corporation
to prove an improper purpose. 8 In application, courts in other jurisdictions have

27. See, e.g., Bill Reno, Inc. v. Rocky Mtn. Ford Dealers' Adver. Ass'n, 378 P.2d 206, 207 (Colo. 1963)
(finding inspection rights against corporation formed under not-for-profit statute with no explicit inspection
provision).
28. See, e.g., Meyer v. Board of Managers of Harbor House Condominium Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 14, 17 (i1.
App. 1991) (citing state statute holding associations to the same inspection standards as non-profits).
29. See, e.g., State v. State Cloud Milk Producers' Ass'n, 273 N.W. 603, 605-06 (Minn. 1937) (stating
inspection was allowed in spite of statute's language extending inspection rights only to stock corporations because
statute codified broader common law rule without restriction). Cf. Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 472 (Del.
1995) (finding that inspection was not allowed because members of a stock cooperative corporation were not
shareholders).
30. Only six states, including New Mexico, have electric cooperative legislation. See IND. CODE §§ 8-1-13-1
to -42 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (Rural Electric Membership Corporation Act, with provision allowing for state utility
regulatory commission to inspect or order inspection of books and records); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 279.010-.220
(Banks-Baldwin 1996) (nameless act, without inspection provision, allowing for issuance of stock to select members;
no "bridge" to business or non-profit acts); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 394.010-.315 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) (Rural
Electric Cooperative Law, with no inspection provision, no stock, no bridge); OrLA. STAT. tit. 4, §§ 437.00-.30
(1986); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-49-10 to -1330 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997) (Rural Electric Cooperative Act,
no inspection provision, no stock, no bridge). Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-15-1 to -33 (Repl. Pamp. 1993) (Rural
Electric Cooperative Act, no inspection provision, no stock, bridge to Business Corporation Act).
31. See Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 797 P.2d 130, 130-32 (Idaho 1990); see also IDAHO CODE §§ 30-301
to -332 (1980) (Idaho has no Rural Electric Cooperative formation law).
32. See Stueve, 797 P.2d at 133. The Idaho Nonprofit Act contained a similar yet more explicit bridge than
that of New Mexico's Rural Electric Cooperative Act providing for application of Idaho's Business Corporation Act
to nonprofits, except where the two acts conflict. CompareIDAHO CODE § 30-303 (1980), cited in Stueve, 797 P.2d
at 132, with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-15-3(Q) (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
33. See Stueve, 797 P.2d at 132.
34. See id. at 133.
35. Unique among most inspection statutes, Delaware has codified this portion of the definition. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (Repl. Vol. 1991).

36. See FLETCHER, supranote 9, § 2222, at 386; see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.02(c) (1984). The
official comment to § 16.02(c) indicates that the section deliberately incorporates "proper purpose" in its formulation
so as to encompass the body of case law surrounding this term of art. See id. (Official Comment to § 16.02(c)).
37. A study of Delaware inspection cases reveals that stockholders gained access to shareholder lists seventyeight percent of the time and access to books and records sixty-eight percent of the time. See Thomas, supra note 8,
at 354-56.

38. See Kalanges v. Champlain Valley Exposition, Inc., 632 A.2d 357, 359-60 (Vt. 1993) (citing thirteen cases
from as many jurisdictions in the last forty-five years as illustration of a trend away from the common law burden
placement upon the shareholder). But see CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792 (Del. 1982) (placing
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found a wide variety of proper inspection purposes. For example, proper purposes
can include determining whether corporate affairs are legally conducted,3 9 obtaining
a list of other shareholders in hopes of consummating a tender offer,"o and valuing
one's stock.4' Examples of improper purposes defeating the inspection right include
43
non-specific demands for a shareholder list,42 strictly personal investment concerns,
and to gain a competitive advantage over the party resisting inspection." In a notable
line of Delaware cases, improper purposes were rendered irrelevant and did not
preclude inspection so long as the shareholder had previously established a proper
purpose.45
B.

New Mexico
New Mexico statutory law on shareholder inspection of business' and non-profit4 7
corporation books and records substantially comports with that of a majority of other
jurisdictions. 8 Indeed, the inspection right section of the state's Business Corporation

the burden of proof on the shareholder); Meyer v. Board of Managers of Harbor House Condominium Ass'n, 583
N.E.2d 14, 17 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (placing the burden of proof on the shareholder).
39. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 4-6 (Del. 1993) (holding that where corporate
affairs were being conducted illegally, a stockholder could inspect corporate records to solicit other shareholders to
join in litigation).
40. See, e.g., Davey v. Unitil Corp., 585 A.2d 858, 861-62 (N.H. 1991) (even when list would be turned over
to an offeror who was otherwise without access to list).
41. When courts accept them as proper, valuation purposes yield access limited to that information necessary
to establish value and are not a carte blanche grant of access. See, e.g., Tatko v. Tatko Bros. Slate Co., 569 N.Y.S.2d
783, 785 (App. Div. 1991) (granting shareholder of closely-held corporation already in possession of latest financial
report greater access to establish "book value"). Cf Advance Concrete Form, Inc. v. Accuform, Inc., 462 N.W.2d
271, 275-76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that because any shareholder could maintain that an inquiry is to value
stock, such a bald assertion would restore an absolute right of inspection, negating state statute).
42. See, e.g., Weisman v. Western Pac. Indus., 344 A.2d 267,267-69 (Del. Ch..1975) (holding that stated
purpose to communicate with other shareholders "with respect to how [the company] may more profitably and
beneficially manage their resources and assets" as too vague and thus improper).
43. See, e.g., Shabshelowitz v. Fall River Gas Co., 588 N.E.2d 630, 633-34 (Mass. 1992) (denying access to
stockholder list where purpose was to solicit other shareholders for purchase of their stock, noting that in
Massachusetts a shareholder's purpose must advance the company's interest and not just relate to his or her position
as such).
44. See, e.g., Advance Concrete, 462 N.W.2d at 277-78.
45. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. 1993); CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll,
453 A.2d 788, 793 (Del. 1982); Helmsman Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. A&S Consultants, Inc., 525 A.2d 160, 164 (Del. Ch.
1987). Cf. Advance Concrete, 462 N.W.2d at 276 (not granting access, given that the purpose alleged, although
proper, was not actually primary).
46. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-50(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1993). This is part of the Business Corporation Act
which states:
Any person who shall have been a holder of record of shares or of voting trust certificates therefor
at least six months immediately preceding his demand or who shall be the holder of record of, or
the holder of record of voting trust certificates for, at least five percent of all the outstanding
shares of the corporation, upon written demand stating the purpose thereof, may examine, in
person, or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for any proper purpose, its
relevant books and records of account, minutes and record of shareholders and make extracts
therefrom.
Id.
47. See id. § 53-8-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1983 & Supp. 1996). "All books and records of a corporation may be
inspected by any member, or his agent or attorney, for any proper purpose at any reasonable time." Id. The Nonprofit
Corporation Act is found at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-8-1 to -99 (Repl. Pamp. 1983 & Supp. 1996).
48. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 2215, at 348.
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Act adopted that of the 1970 Model Business Act nearly verbatim.4 9 State case law
interpreting the statutes, however, is underdeveloped. In the only significant New
Mexico shareholder inspection decision, Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing
Co., 50 the supreme court interpreted the business corporation inspection law
generously, in favor of the shareholders, but with limits.5 The Schwartzman court
affirmed that the minority shareholders, who had alleged misappropriation of assets
and oppressive conduct on the part of the majority shareholders, could inspect the
books of a closely held family corporation.52 However, the court held that such rights
had boundaries, which the trial court properly fixed.53 At issue in Schwartzman,
5
therefore, was the scope of inspection rights, rather than their existence. '
Prior to Schein, no New Mexico decision had addressed inspection rights for
members of cooperatives formed under the Rural Electric Cooperative Act. Indeed,
that Act has no inspection provision. However, section 62-15-3(Q) of that Act applies
the provisions of the Business Corporation Act55 to rural electric cooperatives when
the Rural Electric Cooperative Act5 6 is silent. No New Mexico decision has addressed
57
inspection rights of nonprofit members under the Nonprofit Corporation Act.
IV. RATIONALE
The Schein decision marks the first New Mexico interpretation of the "proper
purpose" requirement. This section traces the court's decision, beginning with its
recognition of inspection rights. 58 Next, the focus shifts to the court's extension of
inspection rights to cooperatives59 and its historical discussion and analytical
application of the proper purpose requirement.' The section ends with an
examination of the finding that Schein demonstrated a proper purpose.6'

49. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-50 (Repl. Pamp. 1993). Cf MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 52 (1970). The 1984
revisions to the Model Business Corporation Act somewhat narrow the scope of the earlier provisions, adding, for
example, that the records sought must directly relate to the shareholder's purpose. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §
16.02(c) (1984). However, the revised Act still contains, deliberately, the necessity of a "proper purpose." Id.
50. 99 N.M. 436, 659 P.2d 888 (1983).
51. See id. at 439, 659 P.2d at 891.

52. See id. at 438, 659 P.2d at 890.
53. See id. at 438-39, 659 P.2d at 890-91. Plaintiffs had been sending teams of three to six accountants, who
monopolized the office of the general manager during business hours, hampering his work. After provisions were
made to accommodate the accountants after-hours, and after they failed to regularly appear, the district court allowed
plaintiffs one final period of review, with as many accountants and for as much time as they wished. The accountants
worked for thirty or forty consecutive hours. See id.
54. See id. at 439, 659 P.2d at 891.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-11-1 to -18-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1993 & Supp. 1996).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-15-1 to -32 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-8-1 to -99 (Repl. Pamp. 1983 & Supp. 1996).
See Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 122 N.M. 800, 803, 932 P.2d 490, 493 (1997).
See id.
See id. at 803-05, 932 P.2d at 493-95.
See id. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
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A.

Right of Inspection
In Schein, the court stated the majority rule, codified62 and applied previously in
Schwartzman,63 that a shareholder has the right to inspect corporate records at
reasonable times and places, for proper purposes.' Indicating its support for a policy
of "generous access" in favor of shareholders, and setting the tone for the decision,
the court credited a shareholder's possessory interest in the corporation as grounds
for supporting inspection.65
B.

Types of Organizations
As a statutory basis for Schein's right of inspection, the Schein court cited the
inspection provision of New Mexico's Business Corporation Act.' The court did not
explain how or why the state's for-profit laws applied to NORA, a rural electric
"cooperative nonprofit member corporation," 7 nor did it invoke the inspection rights
granted under New Mexico's Nonprofit Corporation Act." Without so stating, the
court may have relied on subsection 3(Q) of the Rural Electric Cooperative Act,
which provides a bridge to the Business Corporation Act for "such other and further
activities and transactions for the mutual benefit of its members and patrons" not
already enumerated in the Act or the cooperative's articles of incorporation or
bylaws. 69
Regardless of whether or not the court invoked subsection 3(Q) implicitly, or
simply overlooked it, the court bolstered its extension of inspection rights to
cooperatives by analogy to other jurisdictions.7" The Schein court cited with
approval 7' cases in which other courts allowed inspection of a non-stock, for-profit
mutual corporation comprised of capital contributing members,72 a non-profit
corporation by a dissolved corporate member,73 and a non-stock, for-profit
association formed under a state Cooperative Act.74 The court also noted a Delaware
decision, which denied cooperative members' inspection rights.75 In that case, Shaw
v. Agri-Mark, Inc., the state court of appeals certified a question to the Delaware
Supreme Court asking if inspection was allowed for non-stockholding equity capital
supplying members of a cooperative for which only directors were issued limited
stock.76 In answer, the Delaware court held that where members and stockholders co-

62. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-50 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
63. See Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co., 99 N.M. 436,439, 659 P.2d 888, 891 (1983).
64. See Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 122 N.M. 800, 803, 932 P.2d 490, 493 (1997).
65. Id.
66. See id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-50 (Repl. Pamp. 1993)).
67. As defined by the Rural Electric Cooperative Act under which NORA was formed. See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 62-15-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
68. See id.
§ 53-8-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1983 & Supp. 1996)
69. See id. § 62-15-3(Q) (Repi. Pamp. 1993).
70. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
71. See id.
72. See Fleisher Dev. Corp. v. Home Owners Warranty Corp., 856 F.2d 1529, 1530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
73. See Bill Reno, Inc. v. Rocky Mtn. Ford Dealers' Adver. Ass'n, 378 P.2d 206, 207 (Colo. 1963).
74. See State v. State Cloud Milk Producers' Ass'n, 273 N.W. 603 604-05 (Minn. 1937).
75. See Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 122 N.M. 800,803,932 P.2d 490,493 (1997) (citing
Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 67 F.3d 18, 19 (2d Cir. 1995)).
76. See Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 67 F.3d 18, 19 (2d Cir. 1995).
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exist, they possess distinct rights, which, for members, do not include the right of
inspection reserved under the common law specifically for shareholders."
C. ProperPurpose
In reaching its decision in Schein, the court placed the burden of proof upon the
respondent to prove a shareholder's improper purpose.78 The Schein court considered
ahn improper purpose to be one harmful to the corporation. 79 "Consistent with this
policy of allowing generous access," the court assumed shareholders act in good faith
and have a proper purpose.8" Further, bare assertions of impropriety will not suffice
to stop inspection, as the court noted in Curkendall v. United Federation of
82
CorrectionOfficers, Inc.81 The Schein court cited Curkendallwith approval. There,
the corporation's motion to deny inspection, supported with affidavits of the
83
shareholder's bad faith, met the corporation's burden of showing improper purpose.
Thus, a corporation in New Mexico must enunciate "strong and articulable" reasons
for denying inspection.'
The Schein court's determination of what constitutes a proper shareholder purpose
relied on other jurisdictions favoring access to corporate records for legitimate
shareholder concerns.85 In the course of its survey, the court first found that a proper
purpose should reasonably relate to legitimate shareholder interests, such as assessing
corporate investments. 86 The court then found that a proper purpose should not harm
the corporation or other shareholders.87
According to the opinion, Schein gave three primary purposes for her desire to
inspect NORA's legal bills.88 First, she wanted to inform herself of the bills'
contents; second, she hoped to inform other cooperative members; and third, she

77. See Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 470 (Del. 1995). Both parties conceded that inspection was
not warranted under Delaware statute reserving inspection rights only for "a stockholder of record." Id. at 468. The
Delaware Supreme Court had not considered a case such as Schein questioning inspection rights of a member of a
non-stock corporation under statutory or common law. See id. at 469.
78. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
79. See id. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495.
80. Id. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
81. 438 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (App. Div. 1985).
82. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
83. See Curkendall v. United Fed'n of Correction Officers, Inc., 438 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (App. Div. 1985).
84. Schein, 122 N.M. at 803, 923 P.2d at 493.
85. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493-4. (citing Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905);
Uldrich v. Datasport, Inc., 394 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); State ex. rel. Kennedy v. Continental Boiler
Works, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Davey v. Unitil Corp., 585 A.2d 858 (N.H. 1991); Tatko v. Tatko
Bros. Slate Co., 173 A.2d 917 (N.Y. 1991); Carter v. Wilson Constr. Co., 348 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 1986); Shaw v.
Hurst, 582 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1990); Sto-Rox Focus on Renewal Neighborhood Corp. v. King, 398 A.2d 241 (Pa. 1979)).
86. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 804, 932 P.2d at 494 (finding "shareholder's request for information about
corporation's investments reasonably germane to status as shareholder"). For this proposition, the court cited Advance
Concrete Form v. Accuform, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). That decision, however, discussed the
propriety of a request to value a shareholder's own investment in the corporation. See Advance Concrete, 462 N.W.2d
at 275. The court there found such a purpose met the "reasonably related" test. See id. But the court further found
that purpose unbelievable and thus disallowed inspection. See id.
87. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 804, 932 P.2d at 494.
88. See id.Although the court here characterized Schein's desire to publish newsworthy information as one
of three primary purposes, it later relegated this purpose to secondary status. See id. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495. In so
doing, the court declined to hold that secondary purposes did not matter. The potential for harm from a secondary
purpose could still defeat inspection. See id.
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proposed to notify the general public of any newsworthy information." In finding
that these purposes reasonably related to her membership in the cooperative, the court
validated her interest in the cooperative's use of legal services.' ° The court reasoned
that contracting for legal services and the value of services received can affect the
value of a share or rural electric cooperative capital account. 9' Thus, shareholders'
and members' interest in such legal services questions reasonably relates to their
position as shareholders and members concerned about their investment.92
The court further found none of Schein's purposes harmful to the corporation or
other shareholders.93 Proposed publication of the legal billing information that Schein
sought, in this situation, would not defeat inspection. 94 In so finding, the supreme
court deferred to the district court, which it deemed better positioned to assess the
95
propriety of the redacted information that the district court had reviewed in camera.
That Schein court found the redacted information, even if published, would not harm
NORA.96 Thus, because Schein's request reasonably related to her role as a
shareholder and did not pose any harm to NORA, Schein met the proper purpose
test. 97
V. ANALYSIS
By its selective treatment of Schein's stated purposes, the Schein court seemed
determined to grant inspection and to find publication to be a proper purpose. In
doing so, the court rejected arguments that the billing information sought was
confidential information and inappropriate for newspaper publication.9" The court
said nothing about a potentially improper purpose raised in deposition,99 only
partially addressed another,ro and instead discussed a purpose that Schein never
alleged.' '
The Schein court could have barred disclosure, even with a finding of proper
purpose, had it adopted NORA's argument that the attorney-client privilege protected
the redacted billing information." 2 While recognizing that materials subject to the

89. See id. at 804, 932 P.2d at 494.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 804-05, 932 P.2d at 494-95.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Appellant's Brief-In-Chief at 15-16, Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., 122 N.M. 800, 932
P.2d 490 (1997) (No. 23,333) (suggesting curiosity as a proper purpose).
100. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495 (discussing the impact on "the capital accounts of NORA").
Cf.Appellee's Answer-Brief-In-Chief at 14, Schein (No. 23,333) (proposing inspection "to investigate matters bearing
on the value of her capital account" as a proper purpose).
101. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 804, 932 P.2d at 495 (suspicion of mismanagement as a proper purpose).
102. See id. N.M. R. Cir. P. 11-503(B) (1986), provides in part that: "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client." Id. Rule 11-503(A) defines a confidential
communication as one "not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in
furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication." Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

attorney-client privilege may be kept from shareholders, the court held that the limits
of the privilege do not extend to billing information. 3 The court likened the
materials sought to information about the purpose for which NORA retained an
attorney, the steps the attorney took in fulfilling his obligations, and the general°4
nature of legal services provided, none of which are confidential and protected)
The court also rejected NORA's assertion of confidentiality, holding that a mere
assertion of sensitivity would lead to unwarranted protection.0 5 Thus, the court's
action reinforces existing authority holding that simple inquiries into the dates legal
services are rendered, the time allotted, and the nature of the work performed are not
privileged."' 6 More importantly, it limits corporate options in searching for a device
to protect against disclosure of information relating to the company's dealings with
its lawyers. A question of shareholder access will not create exceptions for traditional
boundaries of attorney-client privilege.
The common-law shareholder right of inspection, purportedly adopted by the court
in Schein, °7 denied that right when its object was merely to satisfy curiosity. 08 The
court's decision, however, does little to clarify the line in New Mexico between mere
curiosity and legitimate proper purpose. The court defined Schein's goal as to
"inform" herself and others about the bills' contents, and perhaps publish her
findings.' 9 However, certain of her statements taken in deposition could lead one to
believe that Schein was engaged in nothing more than the sort of fishing expedition
frowned upon by the common law.' Perhaps due to Schein's invocation of several
other purposes, or the fact that curiosity underlies every request for shareholder
access, the Schein court chose not to address statements suggestive of mere
inquisitiveness.
Another of Schein's previously stated purposes not expressly recognized and
inadequately addressed by the court was the valuation of her cooperative capital
account.' Given the type and volume of material previously released to Schein, she
112
probably already had information sufficient to value her account at the cooperative.
Release of itemized legal billing information would not further that purpose. The
court, however, made no mention of this intention which it could have used to deny

103. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495.
104. See id. at 805-06, 932 P.2d at 495-96.
105. See id. at 806, 932 P.2d at 496.
106. See id.; see also Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80
F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
107. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
108. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 2219, at 368.
109. Schein, 122 N.M. at 804-05, 932 P.2d at 494-95.
110. See Appellant's Brief-ln-Chief at 15-16, Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 122 N.M. 800,
932 P.2d 490 (1997) (No. 23,333). "[S]he 'thought it would be interesting to see what issues attorneys had been asked
to address for the Co-op' and 'was interested to see if [NORA's counsel] had been dealing with my case since March
of '94, as well as what other issues [counsel] had been dealing with."' Id. She also wanted to screen the information
and "if it was interesting to me" to publish it to let readers decide if the attorney's fees in question were reasonable.
Id. at 16.
111. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 14, Schein (No. 23,333) (claiming investigation of "matters bearing on
the value of her capital account" are a proven, and proper, objective).
112. See Schein 122 N.M. at 802, 932 P.2d at 492 (indicating NORA had previously disclosed a vast array of
financial information); see also Appellant's Brief-In-Chief at 17, Schein (No. 23,333) (citing an admission by Schein
that she needs no further information to value her capital accounO.

Winter 1998]

SCHEIN V. NO. RIO ARRIBA ELECTRIC COOP.

Schein access. It instead focused on a general recognition that a corporation's use of
legal service affects the value of a shareholder's investment."1 3 The court nevertheless
ignored evidence that, for valuation purposes, would render access to billing
narrations irrelevant. Thus, the court's decision leaves open the question of whether
an unsupported assertion of intent to value one's investment suffices to constitute a
proper purpose in New Mexico.
Although the Schein court omitted discussion of some of Schein's purposes, it did
discuss a purpose that Schein did not assert." 4 As a defense, NORA argued that
Schein had no basis for suspecting improper behavior on the part of NORA
management.' Indeed, Schein made no such allegation. The court, however,
dispelled the notion that successful shareholder plaintiffs, like those in Schwartzman
v. Schwartzman Packing Co.," 6 must suspect and allege improper managerial
behavior before requesting inspection.17 According to the court, requiring such
suspicions might actually make mismanagement more likely and would also deny
shareholders their ownership rights.'" Thus, the Schein court's clarification of
Schwartzman, dispensing with the need to suspect and allege managerial abuses,
further tips the balance in shareholders' favor.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The Schein decision may adversely affect companies and their shareholders, and
cooperatives and their members, in New Mexico. Among managers, the Schein
decision should promote accountability. A wide range of business forms should now
be on notice that their shareholders or members are afforded a general presumption
of propriety when seeking access to corporate books, records and probably
shareholder lists. New Mexico cooperative members will better appreciate their
highly respected ownership rights. All parties interested in the impact of law on
economic development, including New Mexico courts, may well be concerned if
New Mexico adopts a general rule that publication is always a proper purpose.
Although the publication purpose should clearly be limited to the facts of this case,
the analysis in Schein may nonetheless discourage business enterprises considering
incorporating here. This section will therefore discuss Schein's implications for
managers and shareholders, and will then discuss how business enterprises and New
Mexico courts might react.
A. ManagementPerspective
Leaving aside consideration of propriety of purpose, which was not an issue in her
previous requests and legal battles with NORA, Schein obtained access earlier to
contracts, budgets, financial statements, audit reports, invoices, bank statements,
reconciliations, check registers, expense account information and management salary

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Schein, 122 N.M. at 804,932 P.2d at 494.
See id.
See id.
99 N.M. 436, 438-39, 659 P.2d 888, 890-91 (1983).
See Schein, 122 N.M. at 804, 932 P.2d at 494.
See id.
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data." 9 The only information the courts denied her were staff salary figures.'20 The
message to New Mexico corporations, therefore, is to prepare to disclose to
stockholders in nearly unlimited fashion.
When considering propriety of purpose, the court's placement of the burden of
proof further favors disclosure. New Mexico corporations must state "strong and
articulable" reasons for denying shareholder access to corporate records.12 ' For
management, this burden will result in the need for investigation and support to
overcome the shareholder's presumption of proper purpose. Further, allegations, even
if supported, that the shareholder has no basis for suspecting improper or illegal
actions on the part of management will not militate against shareholder inspection.'22
Therefore, the corporate lawyer's burden will be to demonstrate the potential for
23
harm to the corporation with well-supported pleadings to meet the high standard.'
Although not successful for NORA here, the court in Schein recognized that
arguments of confidentiality and privilege might also succeed in stopping
disclosure.' 24 However, such approaches are likely to be less effective because they
merely state limited varieties of harm. A court may limit shareholder disclosure by
finding that narrow spans of requested information would violate privacy or privilege
rights if divulged, and thus may limit, rather than fully preclude shareholder
disclosure. Arguing that access would harm individuals within the organization or the
relationships between the company and outside professionals may serve as a partial
bar to inspection. On the other hand, arguing access to information may harm the
company as a whole could effectively block inspection.
B.

ShareholderPerspective
Rural electric cooperative members, as well as shareholders of New Mexico
corporations, may be concerned that a broad reading of Schein will over-expose an
entity's activities to public view. All parties, however, should bear in mind that
Schein pursued a rather restricted scope of information. Schein sought access to the
redacted narration of NORA's legal bills.' 25 NORA previously revealed to her the
totals of these bills. 26 In deciding whether publication of the narratives on NORA's
legal bills would be harmful to NORA, and thus an improper purpose, the court
relied heavily on the district court's finding of harmlessness. 27 The court did not
rule, nor was it asked to rule, on publication as a proper purpose for any of the

119. See id. at 802, 932 P.2d at 492.
120. See id. The district court reasoned that distribution of such information might violate employees' privacy
interests, vitiating disclosure. See id.
121. See id. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
122. See id. at 804, 932 P.2d at 494.
123. See id. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495.
124. See id. at 806, 932 P.2d at 495-96.
125. See id. at 802, 932 P.2d at 492.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495. The court here cited Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36
(1984) (stating that the district court is in the best position to weigh parties' needs and interests). That case involved
publication of information gleaned in discovery, for some of which the Supreme Court held barring publication would
not violate First Amendment rights. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 31. The Schein court may have wanted to stave
off a constitutional question in referring to a case with comparable facts for an unrelated and relatively minor
proposition concerning the weight of a district court's review.
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previous disclosures NORA made to Schein. 128 Instead, the court accepted possible
publication as appropriate only for the limited billing information that it characterized
as "ministerial" 29 and otherwise not damaging if disclosed to the public.1 30 Further,
given the unprecedented acceptance of publication as a proper purpose, the
practitioner arguing for such a purpose may be advised to limit Schein' s support for
such a proposition to its context.
However, the shareholder advocate in New Mexico need not hesitate to allege
valuation as a proper purpose. For those representing stockholders of closely held
businesses where financial information may be less forthcoming than from a large,
public entity with a regular reporting timetable, 31 a desire to value one's investment
has been an acceptable purpose in most jurisdictions, 132 and New Mexico promises
to be no exception. Indeed, dicta in Schein indicates New Mexico's intent to follow
the majority rule. 133 New Mexico practitioners, however, should note three points of
caution. First, valuation materials in many instances may already be available to the
shareholder through proactive corporate disclosures and shareholders' meetings.
Schein, however, had sufficient financial assessment materials" and nonetheless
argued valuation as proper purpose. 135 Fortunately for her, the court did not deny
her. 36 The shareholder with a smaller array of purposes may not be so lucky. Second,
disclosure, if granted, will probably be limited to only that information necessary for
valuation purposes. Third, valuation purposes will likely protract litigation as a
district court sifts through volumes of records to determine which are necessary and
which are not.
Further, the New Mexico shareholder need not fear alleging mismanagement as
a proper purpose. Although Schein did not raise the issue, the opinion is replete with
language recognizing that a shareholder's reasonable suspicion of mismanagement
will warrant inspection. 37 New Mexico has already recognized the legitimacy of that
purpose in Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co. 38 Because the issue there was

128. Schein used previously disclosed information as material for news stories in the Rio Grande Sun,
publication of which had not been litigated. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 802, 932 P.2d at 492.
129. Id. at 806, 932 P.2d at 496.
130. See id. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495.
131. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1994), requires companies with 500 or
more shareholders and assets greater than $10 million, as modified by SEC rule, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1997),
to file annual or other comparable reports with the SEC, see id. §§ 240.13a-1 to .13a-16, and make disclosures to
shareholders, see id. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14f-1. The purpose of these regulations is, in part, to promote accurate
valuation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1994).
132. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 2224, at 404.
133. See Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 122 N.M. 800, 804, 932 P.2d 490,494 (1997) ("A
proper purpose can include a desire to place a monetary value on stock interests... Like any business choice, the
selection of legal services and a determination of the value of services received are relevant inquiries to a party
concerned about his investment in the entity .... ).
134. See Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 17, Schein v. Northern Rio ArribaElec. Coop., Inc., 122 N.M. 800, 932
P.2d 490 (1997) (No. 23,333).
135. See Appellee's Answer-Brief-in-Chief at 14, Schein (No 23,333).
136. See Schein 122 N.M. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493.
137. See id. at 804, 932 P.2d at 494 ("Reasonable purpose can also include inspection of corporate records to
ensure that a nonprofit is managed properly ... [S]uch access allows for ... deterrence of abuses by corporate
directors.").
138. 99 N.M. 436, 438, 659 P.2d 888, 890 (1983).
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the scope of relief, the supreme court presumed the shareholders' propriety of
purpose in successfully alleging managerial wrongdoing. 19
Supported allegations of mismanagement can serve as a springboard to other
actions. For example, mismanagement can be the purpose for inspection when a
disgruntled shareholder is upset with a lack of dividends. Because under New
Mexico statute, a corporation is under no obligation to pay a dividend, 1" simple
allegations to that effect will not succeed. However, if the basis for a failure to pay
dividends is managerial impropriety, as is often the case, the court may grant
inspection, which in turn could lead to larger relief.141 Mismanagement can also
provide support for access to a company's shareholder list. Management may be so
bad that a shareholder suing the corporation can successfully gain access to the
42 list
to recruit other plaintiffs from among shareholder ranks to join in a lawsuit.'
A shareholder's mere recitation from the index of previously proven shareholder
purposes should not necessarily guarantee access. Cloaking one's true purpose
intentionally may not be effective. In a well-reasoned decision, Advance Concrete
Form, Inc. v. Accuform, Inc., which found all of the shareholder's stated purposes
proper, a Wisconsin court refused to allow inspection because those purposes were
simply unbelievable." 4 In that case, both parties were fierce competitors in the same
industry.'45 After hiring away an employee from its smaller competitor, the larger
purchased the employee's stock, thus acquiring an interest in the competing
company
corporation.146 The new shareholder then requested access to its rival's books and
records, ostensibly to value its investment and to assess the previous year's
performance. 147 While the Advance Concrete court found such purposes proper, it
denied inspection because of a past history of stiff competition, the potential harm
to the smaller company from disclosure of vital records, and the admitted lack of a
market for its stock. 14' The Advance Concrete court found the larger company's
stated purposes unbelievable because of the company's underlying motive.149
New Mexico shareholders therefore should be wary of the court's power to assess
shareholder veracity. The Schein court couched this warning in its language
discussing secondary purpose. The court, in a marked departure from the Delaware
rule that an ulterior secondary purpose is irrelevant, 5 ° cautioned against improper
secondary purposes that might defeat proper primary purposes.' Although the
Schein court's admonition differs slightly from that of the Wisconsin Court of
139. See id. at 438-39, 659 P.2d at 890-91.
140. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-44 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
141. See, e.g., Kelley v. Axelson, 687 A.2d 268, 272 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
142. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 1993).
143. 462 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
144. See id. at 276.
145. See id. at 277.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 273.
148. See id. at 276-77.
149. See id. at 276-78.
150. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
151. See Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 122 N.M. 800, 805, 932 P.2d 490, 495 (1997).
Although the court previously considered Schein's proposal of publication to be a primary purpose, see id. at 804,
932 P.2d at 494, here it implied that publication was instead a secondary purpose, but nonetheless proper, see id. at
805, 932 P.2d at 495.
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Appeals, which was faced instead with an improper primary purpose, the result is
comparable: improper purposes harmful to the corporation, stated or implicit, will not
be tolerated.
C. Effect on New Mexico's Business Climate
The Schein decision in many ways follows the national norm. While no court has
ever considered publication as a proper purpose, others have affirmed inspection
rights for members of rural electric cooperatives 52 and found that legal bills targeted
for inspection do not necessarily qualify for the attorney-client privilege.' The
Schein court cited the same "proper purpose" test that others use."M It also placed the
burden of proving an improper purpose on the corporation, as many other
jurisdictions do.'55 Additionally, the Schein court ultimately recognized the
shareholder's right of inspection, as the majority of courts do that face shareholder
inspection requests.'56 In application, however, the Schein decision may be a
troublesome signal regarding New Mexico's sensitivity to the justifiable needs of
corporate management.
The recognition that publication of information gleaned from inspection is a
proper purpose is without precedent. While Schein could do little harm if limited to
its facts, future New Mexico court cases may not. True, the court said publishing the
legal bills is an acceptable purpose "in this instance."' 57 The opinion, however, fails
to explicitly acknowledge the glaring difference between Schein and the vast majority
of shareholder inspection decisions-the public nature of the targeted organization.
NORA, for all intents, is a nonprofit public utility,' run without competition for the
benefit of captive members who own no stock.'59 Members, therefore, participate not
to earn money on an investment but simply because they live in the surrounding area
and do not want to live without electricity."W Although the court did cite decisions' 6 '
involving non-profits, 62 cooperatives 63 and utilities," it failed to distinguish Schein
explicitly from "true" inspection cases involving business corporations and
stockholders.

152. See Stueve v. Northern lights, Inc., 797 P.2d 130, 131 (Idaho 1990).
153. See Meyer v. Board of Managers of Harbor House Condominium Ass'n, 583 NE.2d 14, 18 (l. App. Div.
1991).
154. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 804, 932 P.2d at 494; FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 2222, at 386 (stating that a
request reasonably relates to requestor's position as a shareholder and is not harmful to the corporation).
155. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 803, 932 P.2d. at 493; see also supra note 37.
156. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 803, 932 P.2d at 493; Thomas, supra note 8, at 334-35.
157. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495.
158. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3(E), (G) (Repl. Pamp. 1993 & Supp. 1997)
159. Members of New Mexico rural electric cooperatives are like customers of any other regulated New Mexico
public utility--they do not have a choice of a service provider. Service areas do not overlap. See id. § 62-3-1(B) (all
utilities are regulated so as to provide service "without unnecessary duplication and economic waste").
160. Rural electric cooperative members pay some of New Mexico's highest utility rates. See Michael G.
Murphy, Electric Co-op MergerStalls, ALBUQ. J., October 24, 1997, at B4.
161. See Schein, 122 N.M. at 803-04, 932 P.2d at 493-94.
162. See Bill Reno, Inc. v. Rocky Mtn. Ford Dealers' Adver. Ass'n, 378 P.2d 206 (Colo. 1963); Sto-Rox Focus
on Renewal Neighborhood Corp. v. King, 398 A.2d 241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
163. See State v. State Cloud Milk Producers' Ass'n, 273 N.W. 603, 604 (Minn. 1937) (non-stock cooperative
for dairy farmers).
164. See Davey v. Unitil Corp., 585 A.2d 858 (N.H. 1991) (public utility, shares issued).
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Managers of New Mexico business corporations and those shareholders who have
a serious economic stake in the continued well-being of their enterprise may worry
that they might find the contents of the corporation's books and records spread across
the pages of a local paper. The Schein opinion does little to allay those fears.
Concerned parties should nonetheless strive to restrict Schein to its facts. A business
corporation facing the threat of publication of records at the hands of a shareholder
should, and can, compellingly point to NORA's status as a public utility. The
company should point out that a corporation whose purpose is to make money for
shareholders is much more subject to harm by publication than NORA. The
readership of the local newspaper in which Schein wanted to publish her findings
almost certainly consisted of many other cooperative members who, like Schein,
obtained their power from NORA. Publication in the town paper would therefore be
an effective means of reaching many members quickly. However, as the number of
members or shareholders dwindles to a figure more like that of a closely held
corporation, publication of corporate information in a widely circulated community
paper becomes much less appropriate. To publish sensitive information for a large
number of non-members or non-shareholders raises serious questions of propriety.
Publication in such a situation would be more inimical to the interest of the business,
and thus, an improper purpose.
New Mexico businesses justifiably may be concerned about "this policy of
allowing generous access." '65 Certainly the odds are slim that New Mexico
shareholders/journalists, more concerned about their roles as journalists rather than
as shareholders with an economic stake in their enterprise, will seize on Schein as a
way to advance their careers. Inspection cases, however, will arise in other contexts.
Yet, Schein does not set limits on where the "generous access" ends and an improper
purpose begins. True, the court indicated that improper "secondary motives" would
defeat access.'" That still begs the question, which Schein does not answer: What is
an improper purpose? Other jurisdictions have found, for example, that inspection
for curiosity or to second-guess corporate decisions were improper purposes.' 67
Another decision indicates that use of a privileged position to obtain financial
information and then to disclose such information to others could be a breach of a
shareholder's fiduciary duty. 168 When a shareholder hopes to sell information taken
from inspection to third parties, inspection will be denied.169 Several courts have
found valuation to be a proper purpose but have expressly limited inspection to
documents that would further that purpose.170 Because the Schein court declined to

165. Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 122 N.M. 800, 803, 932 P.2d 490, 493 (1997).
166. Id. at 805, 932 P.2d at 495.
167. See Logal v. Inland Steel Indus., 568 N.E.2d 152, 155-56 (1. App. Ct. 1991).
168. See Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Blumberg, 660 N.Y.S.2d 726, 729 (App. Div. 1997) (complaint alleging breach
reinstated where requestor was a board member and one of only two total shareholders, passing information to a
prospective buyer). See also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 685 A.2d 702, 709 (Del. Ch. 1995)
(disclosure to a third party would be improper where it harms the corporation).
169. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, §2226.20, at 416. The reader may question whether this was in fact what
happened in Schein.
170. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 685 A.2d 702, 709 (Del. Ch. 1995); Computer
Solutions, Inc. v. Gnaizda, 633 So.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Tatko v. Tatko Bros. Slate Co., 569
N.Y.S.2d 783, 785-86 (App. Div. 1991).
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attribute any of these purposes to Schein, and thus did not label them as improper,
when or if the court might do so is uncertain.
The Schein decision affects companies and cooperatives in New Mexico in many
ways. All parties now understand that corporations must be prepared to disclose.
Although parties recognize that disclosure for publication is a proper purpose, Schein
should be largely restricted to its facts. Unfortunately, courts may not so limit the
Schein decision. Schein, therefore, may send discouraging signals about business
development in New Mexico.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Schein, the New Mexico Supreme Court defined for the first time what
constitutes a "proper purpose" when a shareholder or member requests access to
corporate books and records. The court held that a rural electric cooperative
member's desire to see a legal bill submitted to the cooperative, and to then publish
its contents, constituted a proper purpose. Because the request reasonably related to
her position as a cooperative member, and in this instance, would not harm the
cooperative, the court granted inspection. Managers and shareholders of New Mexico
corporations are now aware of the court's willingness to force inspection. However,
while the court's decision helps to define certain proper purposes, it fails to address
other potentially improper purposes, thus leaving unanswered questions. Further, the
decision to allow publication of inspection information in a newspaper does not
sufficiently recognize the target entity's uniquely public nature. Thus, the decision
may discourage shareholders and managers alike, especially if the courts prove
willing to apply Schein broadly to other inspection cases.
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